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Abstract
In a demand-side growth model, we show that a developing economy may
experience a steady positive equilibrium growth rate of investment and profit-
as long as investment in the economy is responsive to the aspirations of the
richer section of the population to match the consumption level of the developed
world and imitation of foreign production technology is not very expensive-
irrespective of any changes in income distribution. If the process is accompanied
by no change in the distribution of income then the employment share of the
technologically stagnant sector producing for the poor increases at the cost of
declining growth rate of real wage. On the other hand if the growth process is
accompanied by an exogenous change in the distribution of income induced by
shift in economic policy regime then the positive and stable equilibrium growth
rate of investment is associated with an increasing growth rate of output though
more is gained in terms of increase in output growth when income distribution
improves rather than worsens. On the other hand, growth rate of employment
for the entire economy might decline.
Keywords: Profit-led Growth, Luxury Consumption, Investment, Technology Trans-
fer, Policy Regimes, Income Distribution
JEL Classification: E12, E2, O11, O41, O43, O33
1 Introduction
Over the last three decades most of the developing countries have adopted a more
or less universal set of economic policies, often known as the neo-liberal policies.
These policies aim at liberating the market from government intervention so as to
achieve allocative efficiency. Therefore a particular significance is attached to restrict-
ing the size of budget deficit. Many economists have argued that this has resulted in
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worsening of income inequality in these countries. Assuming this to be true, the post–
Keynesian/Kaleckian growth literature seems to suggest that these economies should
stagnate unless they manage to continuously increase their trade surplus. However
some of these economies have put up very decent growth performance in the face
of decreasing budget deficits. At same time failing to consistently maintain trade
surplus and even have experienced increasing trade deficit. The post-1991 Indian
growth experience, particularly the last decade, being a stand out example.
The post-Keynesian/Kaleckian growth literature places the central emphasis, while
examining the growth process of an economy, in the generation of aggregate demand.
Aggregate demand in the economy is the sum of consumption, investment, budget
deficit and trade surplus. In the absence of budget deficit and trade surplus, dynamics
of consumption and investment explain the growth path of the economy. Consump-
tion is described by the classical savings assumption wherein the entire wage income
is consumed and a fixed proportion of the profit is saved, wage and profit being the
only income categories. On the other hand, investment is assumed to be a function
of demand in the economy. In this set up, a worsening of income distribution is
expected to cause stagnation in the economy. This is because, according to Kalecki
(1971), investment in any given period depends upon decisions taken in previous
periods and these decisions depend upon the level of demand in the previous peri-
ods. Since the entire wage income is consumed, investment generates savings out
of profit equal to itself in the equilibrium. If profit share is fixed by the ‘degree of
monopoly’ then the fixed level of investment determines the level of output. If in-
come distribution worsens, due to an increase in the ‘degree of monopoly’, then in
the equilibrium output level would be less than what it would be in case there is
no change in the income distribution. Since the output is less than what it would
be without worsening of distribution, investment in the next period would be less too.
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) pointed out that the profit rate can be decomposed
into the profit share and capacity utilization, where the latter indicates the level of
demand. They proposed that the investment rate in the economy is a function of
both profit share and capacity utilization. In the case where sensitivity of investment
rate to profit share is greater than that of the savings rate, capacity utilization in
the economy increases with increase in the profit share. They term this as the exhil-
arationist regime contrary to the stagnationist regime where the opposite happens.
However, as pointed out by Rowthorn (1982) and Dutt (1984), if income distribution
is fixed, we will expect that an exogenous increase in the profit share will decrease the
growth rate due to the resulting fall in consumption out of wages. Moreover Blecker
(2002) using linear and Cobb-Douglas specifications for Bhaduri and Marglin’s in-
vestment function has pointed out that exhilarationism either do not arise or arise
only under extreme elasticity assumption on the investment function.
Kalecki (1971) argued that technological innovation is one major factor which can
sustain the growth process. Technological innovation not only leads to obsolescence
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of old machinery and plants leading to their replacement by new ones but also pro-
vides a strong stimulus for investment by opening up new investment opportunities.
In fact he argued that the impact of a steady stream of innovations on investment
is comparable with the impact of a steady increase in profit because both give rise
to “certain additional investment decisions”.1 He also emphasized that despite this
demand-stimulating nature of technological innovation, there is no guarantee that
the degree of utilization of resources stays at a constant level.
Patnaik 2007 argues that in developing countries the richer section of the population
aspire to match the consumption standards of the developed countries. As income dis-
tribution worsens, they are in a position to afford more and more of goods consumed
in the developed countries. With increase in demand for goods consumed in developed
countries, the incentive of firms to produce such goods, by imitating foreign produc-
tion techniques, also increases. Thus he argues that growth and technological change
in the developing countries are induced by the growing demand of the richer section
of the population to consume goods available in the advanced countries as a result
of increase in inequality. Patnaik terms this process as ‘structural-cum-technological’
change. He however concludes that though it is possible for such developing countries
to experience high rates of growth but the growth process is highly unstable and any
sufficiently strong negative shock to investment can take the economy to a state of
stagnation.
In this paper we first show that a developing country can experience a positive equi-
librium growth rate of investment and surplus as long as – investment in the economy
is responsive to the aspirations of the richer section of the population to match the
consumption level of the developed world and imitation of foreign production tech-
nology is not very expensive. Unlike Patnaik (2007), the growth process need not
be unstable but rather can be stable under certain conditions. Moreover worsening
of income distribution is not required to sustain this kind of growth process but a
sufficiently unequal initial distribution of income is enough to propel it. Next, we
show that the technologically dynamic sector producing for the rich is incapable in
generating much employment. If the process is accompanied by no change in the
distribution of income then the employment share of the the technologically stagnant
sector producing for the poor increases at the cost of declining growth rate of real
wage. In case the growth process is accompanied by an exogenous change in the dis-
tribution of income induced by shifts in economic policy regime then the positive and
stable equilibrium growth rate of investment is associated with an increasing growth
rate of output though more is gained in terms of increase in output growth when
income distribution improves rather than worsens. On the other hand, growth rate
of employment for the entire economy might decline.
As for the structure of the paper, in the next section we describe the major assump-
tions of our model. In section 3 and 4, we discuss the existence and local-stability
1Kalecki (1969), pp. 58
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of a positive equilibrium growth rate of investment respectively. In section 5, we
consider change in income distribution caused by changes or shifts in the economic
policy paradigm/regime, for example the government adopting neo-liberal reforms or
becomes more mindful of equity consideration. We consider regime changes which
either worsen (by increasing profit share) or improve (by decreasing profit share) the
income distribution over a period of time. We discuss the impact of such changes in
the distribution of income on the growth rate of output along the equilibrium growth
path of investment. In section 6, we discuss the implications for growth rates of
employment and labour productivity in the economy. And finally section 7 contains
concluding remarks where we summarise and discuss the results.
2 Model
Consider a closed economy model with no government budget. This economy is
neatly divided into two classes- capitalists and workers. The capitalists own all the
means of production, i.e. capital. They carry out production by combining their
capital with hired labour in order to earn profit. The workers have only labour which
they sell to the capitalists in return for wages. The capitalists and the workers con-
sume entirely different goods. The workers consume a subsistence good whereas the
capitalists consume a variety of luxury goods but not the subsistence good. Luxury
goods are defined to be goods which have been developed in the advanced countries
and are initially available for consumption only in these economies. These luxury
goods are substitutes to each other in the sense as new luxury goods are introduced
in the market the old tend to disappear because their demand falls. We assume that
luxury goods are made available in this economy only through imitation of foreign
production technologies.
There are two sectors in the economy- the luxury sector and the non-luxury sec-
tor. In the luxury sector, luxury goods for the capitalists and investment goods
required to produce luxury goods are produced. Similarly in the non-luxury sector,
the subsistence good for the workers and the investment goods required to produce the
subsistence good are produced. There is no technological progress in the non-luxury
sector. On the other hand, following Patnaik 2007, we assume that the production
technology associated with new luxury goods are more labour saving. Over time,
goods with more sophisticated technologies and higher labour productivity are in-
troduced in the advanced countries.2 We will assume that there exists a ranking of
the luxury goods that are introduced in the economy under consideration, such that
the production techniques of newer luxury goods are associated with higher labour
productivity.
2Labour productivity is defined as value of output per unit labour. Values are expressed in terms
of the subsistence good, which is assumed to be the numeraire.
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2.1 Consumption and savings
The workers spend all their wages on the consumption of the subsistence good. The
capitalists consume a part of their profit and save the rest. We assume that the
level of consumption out of profit increases not only when the level of profit increases
but also when, given a level of profit, more and more new luxury goods make their
way into the market. In other words, we assume that consumption out of profit is
directly related to both the level of profit and the rate at which new luxury goods
are introduced in the market.
We will assume that the faster is the rate at which new luxury goods are intro-
duced in this economy, the higher is the rate of change in the labour productivity of
the luxury goods sector, a˙. This is because if at any point of time new luxury goods
are introduced at a faster rate then at that point of time the proportion of new luxury
goods demanded and produced would be greater compared to a situation where there
is a slower rate of introduction of luxury goods. Labour productivity of the luxury
goods sector, a, will increase at a higher rate because one, a faster rate of introduc-
tion means that there are more new luxury goods with higher labour productivities
are produced. And two, since the luxury goods are substitutes in the sense described
above, the output share of old luxury goods is smaller when new luxury goods are
introduced at a faster rate compared to a slow rate. Thus we use the rate of change
in the labour productivity of the luxury goods sector to proxy the rate at which new
luxury goods are introduced in the market.
We can therefore describe consumption out of profit, C, by the following function,
C = C(Π, a˙) (1)
with 0 < CΠ < 1 and Ca˙ > 0, where Π is the level of profit, a˙ is that rate of change in
the labour productivity of the luxury sector which proxies for the rate of introduction
of new luxury goods. Since workers do not save, savings for the economy is given by
S = Π− C(Π, a˙) = S(Π, a˙) (2)
with 0 < SΠ < 1 and Sa˙ < 0.
2.2 Investment
Net investment in this economy is assumed to depend on the current level of profit
and the rate at which new luxury goods are introduced in the market. A high current
level of profit is the predictor of a high future level of demand in the economy and
also a high level of profit eases the financing constraints on the capitalists’ decision
to invest.3 Therefore, we assume investment in the economy to positively depend on
the current level of profit.
3Kalecki, M., 1969
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The relationship between the rate at which new luxury goods are introduced and
investment is ambiguous and depends on the ease with which firms can imitate the
production techniques of the new goods.4 Given our assumptions about consumption
demand out of profit, a higher rate of introduction new luxury goods into the market
is associated with more opportunities to invest for the firms and all firms would like
to invest at a higher rate in the production of new luxury goods.
On the other hand, if cost of imitation is very high, say due to strict enforcement
of intellectual property rights, then at any point of time only a few firms will invest
in the production of new luxury goods. Since we have assumed that as new luxury
goods are introduced in the market older ones tend to disappear, firms producing
old luxury goods, unable to get access to production techniques of the relatively new
luxury goods, will hold back new investment on their existing plants and let their
capital stock depreciate. Moreover if some of the old luxury goods are forced out of
the market as new luxury goods are introduced, firms producing these goods will have
to shut down in case they can not imitate production technology of new luxury goods.
Thus investment in the economy, I, is given by the following function,
I = I(Π, a˙) (3)
with IΠ > 0 where IΠ, while there is no restriction on the sign of Ia˙. a˙ in (3) is again
the proxy for the rate of introduction of new luxury goods.
2.3 Technological change in the luxury goods sector
Technological change in the luxury goods sector is endogenously driven by the growth
of profit in the economy. Any increase in the growth rate of profit in the economy
impacts both the demand and supply of luxury goods. On one hand, increase in the
growth rate of profit increases the incomes of the profit earners at a faster rate. Thus
their ability to consume at the high-end of the goods available in the developed world
increases at a faster rate.5 On the other hand, the ability of the firms to meet the
cost of imitation also increases at a faster rate as the growth rate of profit increases.
Therefore when the growth rate of profit increases it becomes profitable to introduce
more of the high-end goods available in the developed world. The high-end goods in
the developed world are associated with higher labour productivities than the exist-
ing luxury goods in this economy. This combined with our assumption that the old
luxury goods tend to disappear from the market with the introduction of the new
luxury goods, implies that the labour productivity of the luxury goods sector tends
to increase at higher rates.
The current technological capabilities of firms in the economy are commensurate with
the technological requirements of the existing luxury goods being produced within
4Henceforth by investment we mean net investment.
5Patnaik 2007
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the economy. It is reasonable to assume that as one moves up the hierarchy of goods
being produced in the advanced countries, technological requirements of production
become more sophisticated compared to the current technological capabilities of firms
in the economy. Thus as more and more new luxury goods are introduced in the econ-
omy at a point in time, the actual cost of imitation and introduction of additional
new luxury goods increases. Therefore we assume that at any point of time, the rate
of growth of labour productivity of the luxury goods sector in this economy increases
with an increase in the growth rate of profit but at a decreasing rate. This relation-
ship between the growth rate of labour productivity in the luxury goods sector, ga
and the growth rate of profit is given by the following equation.
ga = φ(gΠ) (4)
with φ(0) = 0 and for all gΠ ∈ [0,∞), φ(gΠ) ≥ 0, φ′(gΠ) > 0 and φ′′(gΠ) < 0.6
2.4 Demand-induced changes in the growth rate of profit
Whenever investment in the economy is greater than savings, either price adjustment
happens which raises the share of profit in output leaving aggregate output level
constant or the level of aggregate output increases leaving share of profit in the
aggregate output unchanged or both the adjustments happen simultaneously. In any
case whenever investment is more than savings, the level of profit will rise. Similarly
when investment is less than savings, the level of profit will fall and when investment
is equal to savings, the level of profit will remain unchanged. This process of change
in the level of profit due to mismatch between investment and savings is conveniently
captured by the following equation.
˙(ln Π) = α[ln(
I
S
)] = α(ln I − lnS) (5)
where α is a positive constant.
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to time we get,
g˙Π = α(gI − gS) (6)
6Patnaik 2007 assumes that the growth rate of labour productivity is an increasing convex func-
tion of the growth rate of investment, which in turn is an increasing function of the growth rate of
profit. It is argued that in a developing economy where technology is just imitated from abroad,
there is no given set of knowledge to be progressively used up but rather with increasing investment
more investments in new projects will be taken up. This we feel implicitly assumes that as the
economy moves up the hierarchy of goods in the developed economies at any point of time, the cost
of moving from one step to the next in the hierarchy goes down. Since at any given point in time,
the technological capabilities in the economy are fixed, it is difficult to believe that at the margin
the cost of introducing new luxury goods will go down. Therefore we think φ′′(gΠ) < 0 to be a more
plausible assumption than φ′′(gΠ) > 0.
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where α > 0 and g˙Π is the rate of change in gΠ the growth rate of profit, gI is the
rate of growth of investment and gS is the rate of growth of savings.
7 From (2) and
(3) growth rates of savings and investment are
gS = σS,ΠgΠ + σS,a˙
1
a˙
da˙
dt
(7)
and
gI = σI,ΠgΠ + σI,a˙
1
a˙
da˙
dt
(8)
respectively. σi,j is elasticity of i with respect to j where i = I, S and j = Π, a˙.
σS,Π > 0, σS,a˙ < 0 for a˙ > 0 and σI,Π > 0. σi,j’s are assumed to be constant through-
out.
Substituting for gI and gS from (7) and (8) in equation (6), we obtain
g˙Π = α(σI,Π − σS,Π)gΠ + α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)1
a˙
da˙
dt
(9)
From equation (4), using the definition of growth rate and logarithmic differentiation,
we obtain
1
a˙
da˙
dt
= φ(gΠ) + ρ
g˙Π
gΠ
(10)
where ρ = gΠ
φ(gΠ)
φ′(gΠ) is the elasticity of the growth rate of labour productivity in the
luxury goods sector with respect to the growth rate of profit and ρ > 0 as φ′ > 0.
We assume that ρ is a constant.
Substituting for 1
a˙
da˙
dt
in equation (9) from equation (10) and then re-arranging the
terms we obtain,
g˙Π =
αgΠ[(σI,Π − σS,Π)gΠ + (σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)φ(gΠ)]
[gΠ − α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ] (11)
where g˙Π is not defined for gΠ = α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ. This implies that g˙Π is not de-
fined when φ(α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ) = α(σI,Π − σS,Π)(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ. We will assume that
φ(α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ) 6= α(σI,Π − σS,Π)(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ.8
7Bhaduri 2006 uses a general form function, instead of the natural logarithm function used in
our model, to derive an expression for the rate of change in the growth rate of output, ˙gY , similar to
equation (5), i.e., ˙gY = α[gI − gS ] with α > 0 by assuming that any mismatch between investment
and savings gives rise only to output adjustments. However to get the expression ˙gY = α[gI − gS ]
from the general form function it is assumed that any deviation of investment, I, from an initial
commodity market clearing equilibrium, I = S, stays arbitrarily close to the value of investment
at the initial equilibrium. Moreover it is assumed that whenever I = S, output grows at some
equilibrium rate, g∗Y , in contrast to our contention that gΠ = 0 whenever I = S. We simply argue
that demand side adjustment in the economy, which is the focus of our model, stops whenever I = S.
8By re-arranging equation (11) we get,
˙gΠ[gΠ − α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ] = αgΠ[(σI,Π − σS,Π)gΠ + (σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)φ(gΠ)]
Substituting α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ for gΠ in the above expression gives φ(α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ) = α(σI,Π −
σS,Π)(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ.
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Equation (11) expresses the rate of change of the growth rate of profit, g˙Π, as a
function of the growth rate of profit, gΠ, in the economy.
3 Positive equilibrium growth rate of profit
An equilibrium for equation (11), i.e., g˙Π = 0 implies either gΠ = 0 or [(σI,Π −
σS,Π)gΠ + (σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)φ(gΠ)] = 0. Therefore it is obvious that a positive equilibrium
growth rate of profit exists if and only if the equation
[(σI,Π − σS,Π)gΠ + (σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)φ(gΠ)] = 0
has a positive solution. This implies that σI,Π 6= σS,Π and σI,a˙ 6= σS,a˙. Re-arranging
the above eqution gives us,
φ(gΠ) = zgΠ (12)
where z =
(σS,Π−σI,Π)
(σI,a˙−σS,a˙) , a constant. Notice that the assumptions on the function φ(gΠ),
mentioned in section 2.3, ensure a positive solution of equation (12) as long as z > 0.
In figure 1 g∗Π denotes the positive equilibrium growth rate of profit. Given that profit
grows at the positive equilibrium rate g∗Π, investment and savings in the economy grow
at constant positive rates g∗I = σI,Πg
∗
Π +σI,a˙φ(g
∗
Π) and g
∗
S = σS,Πg
∗
Π +σS,a˙φ(g
∗
Π). Thus
the equilibrium growth rates of investment and savings depend, apart from the equi-
librium growth rate of profit, on the responsiveness of investment and savings to profit
and the rate of introduction of new luxury goods in the economy and on the form
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of the function φ. Moreover from the definition of g∗Π we know that in equilibrium
g∗I = g
∗
S.
The fact that under certain conditions a positive equilibrium growth path of profit
exists in the economy implies that at every instance of time on it investment is greater
than savings by a fixed proportion. Notice that we can re-write equation (4) as
gΠ = α[ln(
I
S
)] (13)
Substituting g∗Π in equation (13) and then re-arranging it, we get the following.
g∗Π
α
= ln(
I
S
) (14)
Since
g∗Π
α
is a positive constant, I
S
must be a constant greater than one. Investment-
savings ratio being a constant greater than one means that the short-run macroeco-
nomic equilibrium characterised by the equality investment and savings in the ex-ante
sense is never realized on the equilibrium growth path of profit in the economy. This
is because profit growth in our model is fueled by the excess of investment over savings
in the ex-ante sense.
4 Stability
Local stability of the equilibrium requires that d ˙gΠ
dgΠ
at gΠ = g
∗
Π is less than zero, where
g∗Π is the positive equilibrium growth rate of profit. Differentiating (11) with respect
to gΠ and then substituting g
∗
Π for gΠ, we get
dg˙Π(g
∗
Π)
dgΠ
=
α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)g∗Π(φ′(g∗Π)− z)
[g∗Π − α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ]
(15)
where
d ˙gΠ(g
∗
Π)
dgΠ
is d ˙gΠ
dgΠ
evaluated at gΠ = g
∗
Π. Now α and g
∗
Π are positive constants.
Existence of positive equilibrium growth rate of profit implies that (φ′(g∗Π)− z) < 0.
To see this notice that φ(gΠ)− zgΠ = 0 at both gΠ = 0 and gΠ = g∗Π. The claim then
necessarily follows from Rolle’s Theorem9 and the assumption φ′′(gΠ) < 0. Thus the
necessary and sufficient conditions for local stability of g∗Π are g
∗
Π > α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ
and σI,a˙ − σS,a˙ > 0.
The first condition, g∗Π > α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ, requires that the equilibrium growth rate
of profit is sufficiently large. We can re-write (11) as
g˙Π = α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ψ(gΠ) + α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ
gΠ
g˙Π (16)
where ψ(gΠ) = φ(gΠ) − zgΠ. The right hand side of equation (16) is the impact of
excess of growth rate of investment over the growth rate of savings, which for the sake
9See, for example Albrecht and Smith 2003, 106
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of simplicity let us call the growth rate of the I/S ratio, on the the rate of change in
the growth rate of profit. Notice the first term in this expression is zero when gΠ = 0,
i.e., (σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ψ(gΠ) = 0 when gΠ = 0, while the second term is zero when g˙Π = 0,
i.e.,
(σI,a˙−σS,a˙)ρ
gΠ
g˙Π = 0 when g˙Π = 0. Therefore we can think of (σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ψ(gΠ) as
the component of the growth rate of the I/S ratio explained by gΠ and
(σI,a˙−σS,a˙)ρ
gΠ
g˙Π
as the component of the growth rate of the I/S ratio explained by g˙Π. From equation
(14), it is clear that the rate of change in the growth rate of profit (g˙Π) has the same
sign as the component of the growth rate of the I/S ratio explained by the growth rate
of profit, (σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ψ(gΠ), if and only if α(σI,a˙−σS,a˙)ρgΠ < 1. g∗Π > α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ im-
plies that for values of gΠ in a sufficiently small neighbourhood of g
∗
Π,
α(σI,a˙−σS,a˙)ρ
gΠ
< 1.
The second condition, σI,a˙ − σS,a˙ > 0, requires that either investment responds non-
negatively to changes in the rate of introduction of new luxury goods or even when
it responds negatively, the responsiveness of savings is more than the responsiveness
of investment.10 In either case, the indirect impact of a positive growth rate of profit
on its rate of change is always positive, i.e., α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)φ(gΠ) > 0. Since z > 0,
σI,a˙−σS,a˙ > 0 implies that σS,Π−σI,Π > 0. So the direct impact of a positive growth
rate of profit on its rate of change is negative, i.e., (σI,Π − σS,Π)gΠ < 0.
Figure 1 shows two values of gΠ, g
a
Π and g
b
Π, close to g
∗
Π. Let us assume that
g∗Π > α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)ρ. This means g˙Π has the same sign as the component of the
growth rate of the I/S ratio explained by gΠ. At g
a
Π, φ(g
a
Π) > zg
a
Π, thus ψ(g
a
Π) > 0.
Therefore, from the definition of ψ(gΠ), α(σS,Π − σI,Π)gaΠ < α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)φ(gaΠ). The
direct negative impact of the growth rate of profit on its rate of change is less than
the indirect positive impact. Thus the component of the growth rate of I/S ratio ex-
plained by gΠ at g
a
Π is positive, which increases gΠ. Similarly at g
b
Π, since ψ(g
b
Π) < 0
we have α(σS,Π − σI,Π)gbΠ > α(σI,a˙ − σS,a˙)φ(gbΠ). In this case the direct negative im-
pact of the growth rate of profit on its rate of change dominates the indirect positive
impact. Therefore, gΠ decreases at g
b
Π. Thus g
∗
Π is locally stable.
5 Changes in income distribution and output growth
In this and the next section we will consider change in the distribution of income
induced by exogenous shifts in the economic policy regime and examine its effect
on output and employment growth in the economy. When policy regime changes
many policy measures are adopted that are expected to have an impact on the dis-
tribution of income in the economy. For example, let us consider government going
in for neo-liberal reforms. In that case many policy changes like easing the norms
for mergers and acquisition, labour reforms, privatization of state run enterprises,
reduction of corporate income tax, etc., would take place that tend to increase the
‘degree of monopoly’ in the economy. As a result we would expect the profit share
to gradually rise over a period of time. On the other hand, suppose the government
10Notice that since σS,a˙ < 0, σI,a˙−σS,a˙ > 0 implies either σI,a˙ ≥ 0 or (σI,a˙ < 0 and |σI,a˙| < |σS,a˙|).
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under popular pressure tries to orient its economic policy towards consideration of
equity. In that case policies like employment guarantee and minimum wages would
be adopted which tend to reduce the ‘degree of monopoly’ and we would expect the
profit share to gradually decrease over a period of time.
In the analysis that follows we consider shifts in policy regime which either im-
prove or worsen the distribution of income and assume that whenever such shifts in
policy regime happen, then the profit share changes continuously at a constant rate
over a period of time. Moreover, we assume that such shifts in policy regime do not
have any independent effect on investment and savings in the economy but through
changes in the level of profit and therefore do not have any independent impact on
the investment-savings gap in the economy. This implies that the equilibrium growth
rate of profit derived in section 3 remains unaffected. Nonetheless, there is an impact
on the adjustment process because any excess of investment over savings increases
profit in order to generate savings. As share of profit gradually change due to shift in
policy regime, it affects the level of profit and also puts pressure on the adjustment
required in the level of profit in response of the investment-savings gap.
In order to examine this clearly and also for closing the model we will assume that
the adjustment in the level of profit in response to investment-savings gap is achieved
only through output increase in the absence of any policy induced increase in the
profit share. In periods along the equilibrium growth path of profit, when there is a
policy induced worsening of the income distribution, i.e., h˙ > 0, a part of the increase
in profit required due to excess of investment over savings is automatically achieved
by the exogenous rise in the profit share while the rest is achieved through endogenous
output increase. On the other hand in case of an improvement in the distribution of
income, i.e., h˙ < 0, decline in profit share will decrease the the level of profit and thus
the excess of investment over savings will result into a greater endogenous adjustment
in the level of output.
By definition Π = Y h, where Y is the total output of the economy and h is share of
profit in output. Therefore the growth rate of profit is gΠ = gY +
h˙
h
, where gY is the
growth rate of output and h˙
h
is the growth rate of profit share. On the equilibrium
growth path of profit, the growth rate of output is,
gY = g
∗
Π −
h˙
h
(17)
We will assume that the change in profit share, h˙, is an exogenously given policy
determined parameter. Thus output grows at a rate equal to the equilibrium growth
rate of profit when income distribution does not change, that is h˙ = 0. When profit
share increases, that is h˙ > 0, then gY < g
∗
Π whereas when profit share decreases,
that is h˙ < 0, gY > g
∗
Π.
The growth rate of output, after these aforementioned changes, however is not con-
stant but increases in both the cases. First suppose h˙ > 0, then profit share, h,
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increases over time. This implies h˙
h
decreases as h˙ is fixed. Thus it follows from (17)
that gY increases as h˙ > 0. Next suppose h˙ < 0, then the profit share, h, decreases
over time. This implies | h˙
h
| increases as h˙ is fixed. Since h˙ < 0, it follows again from
(17) that gY increases. Nonetheless growth rate of output is always higher in the case
of economic policy regime shifting in favour of the workers than the case where the
shift is in favour of the capitalists. This is because when h˙ > 0 then the increase in
growth rate follows a discrete drop from g∗Π and also the increase must taper off at
some point less than g∗Π as h can never become greater than one. On the other hand
when h˙ < 0, then growth rate of output at first jumps above g∗Π and then keeps on
increasing as long as impact of a shift in policy regime in favour of the workers on
the profit share remains.
6 Growth of labour productivity and employment
Labour productivity of the entire economy is the weighted average of labour produc-
tivities in the luxury goods sector and the non-luxury goods sector with the weights
being their respective employment shares. Thus the labour productivity of the entire
economy, x is given by the following equation.
x = ala + b(1− la) (18)
where b is a positive constant which is always less than a. a and b are the labour
productivities of the luxury goods sector and the non-luxury goods sector respectively.
la is the employment share of the luxury goods sector. From (18), the growth rate of
labour productivity in the economy is,
gx =
la
x
{aga + (a− b)gla} (19)
where gx, ga and gla are respectively the growth rates of labour productivity for the
entire economy, the luxury goods sector and the employment share of the luxury
goods sector.
Since only capitalists consume luxury goods, we would expect the share of luxury
goods output in total output to increase as the share of profit in output increases.
Therefore we assume the share of luxury goods output in total output to be an
increasing function of the profit share as described below.
Ya
Y
= f(h) (20)
where 0 ≤ f(h) ≤ 1 and f ′(h) > 0. Ya is the output of the luxury goods sector.
Using the definition of la and (20) we obtain,
la =
f(h)x
a
(21)
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From (21) the growth rate of the employment share of the luxury goods sector is,
gla =
f ′(h)
f(h)
h˙+ gx − ga (22)
Substituting for la and gla respectively from equations (21) and (22) in equation (19)
the re-arranging the terms, we obtain the following expression for the growth rate of
labour productivity in the economy.
gx =
bf(h)ga + (a− b)f ′(h)h˙
{1− f(h)}a+ f(h)b
On the equilibrium growth path of profit ga = φ(g
∗
Π), therefore gx is,
gx =
bf(h)φ(g∗Π) + (a− b)f ′(h)h˙
{1− f(h)}a+ f(h)b (23)
Thus the growth rate of labour productivity in the economy at any instant along
the equilibrium growth path of profit depends on the constant growth rate of labour
productivity in the luxury goods sector, labour productivities of the two sectors, the
share of luxury goods sector’s output in the total output and the exogenously given
rate of change in the profit share. Since a grows at a constant rate gx is not constant
along the equilibrium growth path of profit. In the absence of any exogenous change
in the distribution of income, i.e., when h˙ = 0, from equation (23) we know that
the growth rate of labour productivity in the economy continuously declines over
time. The growth rate of employment in the economy on the equilibrium growth
path of profit is gL = g
∗
Π − gx. As gx falls over time the growth rate of employment
increases to approach g∗Π. This is obvious because when income distribution is fixed
then the employment share of the luxury goods sector declines and approaches zero
as its labour productivity grows at a constant rate. Since labour productivity in the
non-luxury sector is fixed, the growth rate of labour productivity in the economy
must decline and approach zero and the growth rate of employment approaches g∗Π.
The entire gain in the employment in the economy comes in the non-luxury sector
and moreover this decline in gx gets translated into a decline in the growth rate the
real wage which ultimately become stagnant.
However in periods the distribution of income changes (i.e. h˙ 6= 0) due to shifts
in policy regime, then gx need not always decline but can also increase. Let us con-
sider the case of a period when there is worsening of income distribution. Along the
equilibrium growth path of profit h˙ > 0. Since now both a and h are not constants
but grow over time from (23) we can not say whether gx will decline or increase
over time. The increase in labour productivity of the luxury goods sector tends to
decrease its employment share but this is countered by increasing share of its output
due to worsening of income distribution. When the latter tendency out-weighs the
former, gx rises along the equilibrium growth path of profit leading to a possibility of
declining growth rate of employment. We derive some conditions when gx declines in
periods when h˙ > 0 in appendix 1. Similarly in periods when h˙ < 0 too the behaviour
of gx and gL over time are ambiguous.
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7 Conclusion
The basic idea on which the paper is based is that not only the level of demand
but also its composition is important while studying economic growth. In the closed
economy model presented in the paper, we have shown that in a developing country
consumption demand of the richer section of the population for goods available in
developed countries can sustain a positive and steady growth rate of investment and
profit. The consumption demand of the rich for goods available in developed countries
is an incentive to the firms for investing in the production of such goods by imitating
foreign production techniques. In order to capture the aspirations of the rich in the
economy to match the consumption standards in the developed countries, we have
postulated that the consumption out of profit is not only an increasing function of the
level of profit but also of the rate of introduction new luxury goods in the economy,
which are goods that are already available in developed countries. Since a faster rate
of introduction of new luxury goods increases the consumption demand of the richer
section of the population, it also provides an incentive to the producers to invest in
production of such goods, therefore has a tendency to increase net investment . On
the other hand, if imitation is very costly net investment might also decline because
the luxury goods are substitute goods in nature. In fact one condition for the local
stability of equilibrium is that even if investment responds negatively to the rate of
introduction of new luxury goods its responsiveness should be less than that of sav-
ings.
Assuming that overtime goods introduced in the developed countries are more so-
phisticated and are associated with higher labour productivities, we have proxied the
rate of introduction of new luxury goods in the model by the rate of change in the
labour productivity of the luxury sector, a˙. The growth process is associated with a
particular kind of technological change such that the labour productivity in the lux-
ury sector grows at a constant rate whereas by assumption there is no technological
change in the non-luxury sector. The technological change in the luxury sector is
induced by the growth rate of profit which indicates the richer section of the popula-
tion’s ability to afford sophisticated goods available in the developed countries. This
is captured by a Kaldor kind of technological progress function given by equation
(4). The equilibrium growth rate of profit and investment depends upon the respon-
siveness of investment and savings functions to changes in the level of profit and the
rate of change in the labour productivity of the luxury sector along with the form of
the function φ. It is obvious from figure 1 that the equilibrium growth rate of profit
(and the growth rate of investment) increases with exogenous increase in σI,Π, σI,a˙
and |σS,a˙| because they decrease z. On the other hand any increase in σS,Π decreases
the equilibrium growth rate of profit (and the growth rate of investment) because it
increases z. Similarly any upward shift in the curve of the the function φ increases
the equilibrium growth rate of profit (and the growth rate of investment).
If income distribution in the economy is fixed then growth of output along the equi-
librium growth path of profit, is constant and equal to positive equilibrium growth
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rate of profit. From equation (20), it then follows that the growth rate of employ-
ment in the luxury sector is gLa = (1− z)g∗Π. Thus the growth rate of employment in
luxury sector is positive if and only if z < 1, i.e., σS,Π + σS,a˙ < σI,Π + σI,a˙. However
in section 6, we have seen that along the equilibrium growth path of profit, employ-
ment share of the luxury sector continuously declines and approaches zero because
labour productivity in the economy declines while in the luxury sector increases at
a constant rate. Since labour productivity in the economy declines, the growth rate
of employment in the economy increases to approach g∗Π. The gain in employment
comes majorly in the non-luxury sector where technology is stagnant. This gain in
employment growth comes at the cost of decline in the growth rate of real wage which
ultimately becomes stagnant.
In section 5, we have considered shifts in economic policy regime of the govern-
ment, that are either in favour of the capitalists or the workers, on the growth rate
of output along the equilibrium growth path of profit. Whenever such shifts in the
policy regime occur, many policy changes occur that tend to gradually increase the
income share of the class towards which the regime shift is biased. We have assumed
the profit share changes at a constant rate for a period of time when such regime
shifts happen. Assuming that in absence of changes in policy regime only output
adjustment takes place, we show in conformity with the existing post-Kaleckian liter-
ature that the growth rate of output declines when there is an exogenous increase in
the profit share and increases when there is a decrease in the profit share. However in
both cases growth rate of output is not constant but increasing because the impact of
the redistribution on the growth rate of profit share diminishes overtime. As a result
a shift in economic policy regime in favour of the capitalists does create a spectacle
of increasing output growth for sometime but only after an initial decrease. Nonethe-
less much more is to be gained in terms output growth by a shift of policy regime in
favour of the workers, i.e., by improving income distribution rather than worsening
it, because growth rate of output not only increases immediately when policy regime
shifts in favour of the workers but the increase is also sustained.
In section 6 we have seen that in periods when h˙ 6= 0, labour productivity growth in
the economy can increase or decrease both. This is because labour productivity in the
economy is weighted average of the labour productivities in the two sectors with the
weights being their respective employment share. Any change in the income distribu-
tion tends to change the output share of the luxury sector which might counter the
impact on the employment share of the luxury sector due to continuous increase in
its labour productivity. The analysis of impact of government policy induced changes
in income distribution on the growth process presented in the paper is however lim-
ited to only those kinds of policy measures which are less likely to have any direct
bearing upon investment and savings in the economy. In case the change in income
distribution due to shifts in policy regime has independent impact on investment and
savings then the entire analysis would change. This and allowing for simultaneous
adjustment in profit share and output in response to investment-savings gap are on
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the agenda for future research.
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Appendix 1
The total differential of gx is
dgx =
∂gx
∂a
da+
∂gx
∂h
dh (24)
where dgx, da and dh are the changes in gx, a and h respectively with da > 0 and
dh > 0; and ∂gx
∂a
and ∂gx
∂h
are the respective partial derivatives of gx with respect to a
and h.
From equation (23) the partial derivative of gx with respect to a is,
∂gx
∂a
=
f ′(h)h˙
[(1− f(h))a+ f(h)b] −
(1− f(h)){bf(h)φ(g∗Π) + (a− b)f ′(h)h˙}
[(1− f(h))a+ f(h)b]2
and the partial derivative of gx with respect to h is,
∂gx
∂h
=
{bf ′(h)φ(g∗Π) + (a− b)f ′′(h)h˙}
[(1− f(h))a+ f(h)b] +
(a− b)f ′(h){bf(h)φ(g∗Π) + (a− b)f ′(h)h˙}
[(1− f(h))a+ f(h)b]2
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Substituting for ∂gx
∂a
and ∂gx
∂h
in equation (24) and then re-arranging the terms we get,
dgx =
f ′(h)h˙da
[(1− f(h))a+ f(h)b] +
[bf ′(h)φ(g∗Π) + (a− b)f ′′(h)h˙]dh
[(1− f(h))a+ f(h)b]
+
[(a− b)f ′(h)dh− (1− f(h))da][bf(h)φ(g∗Π) + (a− b)f ′(h)h˙]
[(1− f(h))a+ f(h)b]2
Since φ(g∗Π), h˙, a, and b are all positive with a > b and 0 < f(h) < 1, it follows from
the above equation that if f ′′(h) ≥ 0 and (a− b)f ′(h)dh− (1− f(h))da ≥ 0 then dgx
is positive. Otherwise dgx can be negative. Since adh > 0 and
da
dt
= a˙ = aφ(g∗Π) and
dh
dt
= h˙, (a− b)f ′(h)dh− (1− f(h))da ≥ 0 implies,
(a− b)f ′(h)h˙ ≥ a(1− f(h))φ(g∗Π) (25)
If we assume that the share of luxury goods output increases at a constant or an
increasing rate as the profit share increases, i.e., f ′′(h) ≥ 0, then in periods when
government policy changes result in worsening of income distribution, the growth
rate of labour productivity increases as long as the inequality (25) is satisfied.
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